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Abstract--- Smart grid uses the power of information 
technology to intelligently deliver energy to customers by using a 
two-way communication, and wisely meet the environmental 
requirements by facilitating the integration of green technologies. 
Although smart grid addresses several problems of the 
traditional grid, it faces a number of security challenges. Because 
communication has been incorporated into the electrical power 
with its inherent weaknesses, it has exposed the system to 
numerous risks. Several research papers have discussed these 
problems. However, most of them classified attacks based on 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and they excluded 
attacks which compromise other security criteria such as 
accountability. In addition, the existed security countermeasures 
focus on countering some specific attacks or protecting some 
specific components, but there is no global approach which 
combines these solutions to secure the entire system. The purpose 
of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
relevant published works. First, we review the security 
requirements. Then, we investigate in depth a number of 
important cyber-attacks in smart grid to diagnose the potential 
vulnerabilities along with their impact. In addition, we proposed 
a cyber security strategy as a solution to address breaches, 
counter attacks, and deploy appropriate countermeasures. 
Finally, we provide some future research directions. 
 
 
Index Terms— Smart grid, cyber-attacks, vulnerabilities, 
confidentiality, availability, integrity, accountability, IDS, 
cryptography, network security. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Traditional electrical distribution systems are used to 
transport electrical energy generated at a central power plant 
by increasing voltage levels and then delivering it to the end 
users by reducing voltage levels gradually. However, this 
electricity grid has major shortcomings, including the inability 
to include diverse generation sources such as green energy, 
high cost and expensive assets, time consuming demand 
response, high carbon emission, and blackouts. For example, a 
study conducted by researchers at the Berkeley National 
 
 
Laboratory in 2004 showed that power interruptions cost the 
American economy approximately $80 billion per year; other 
estimates indicate a higher cost of $150 billion per year [1]. It 
is evident that these critical problems cannot be addressed 
with existing electricity grid. Smart grid promises to provide 
flexibility and reliability by facilitating the integration of new 
power resources (such as renewable energy, wind, and solar 
energy), enabling corrective capabilities when failures occur, 
reducing carbon footprint, and reducing energy losses within 
the grid. 
Smart grid is a system based on communication and 
information technology in generation, delivery, and 
consumption of energy power. It uses two-way flow of 
information to create an automated and widely distributed 
system that has new functionalities such as, real time control, 
operational efficiency, grid resilience, and better integration of 
renewable technology which will decrease carbon footprint. 
However, risks can still exist in smart grid. Any interruptions 
in power generation could disturb smart grid stability and 
could potentially have large socio-economic impacts. In 
addition, as valuable data are exchanged among smart grid 
systems, theft or alteration of this data could violate consumer 
privacy. Because of these weaknesses, smart grid has become 
the primary target of attackers [2], which attracted the 
attention of government, industry, and academia. 
Several research papers have been published that provide an 
overview of the prevailing problems related to cyber security 
in smart grid infrastructure [3, 7]. In [3], Rawat et al. 
presented a study of the challenges present in smart grid 
security. They classified attacks based upon the type of the 
network, namely, home area network (HAN), neighborhood 
area network (NAN), and wide area network (WAN). In 
addition, they presented the impact of each attack on the 
information security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA). In [4], Shapsough et al. discussed security challenges 
in smart grid system, especially those related to connectivity, 
trust, customer privacy, and software vulnerabilities. The 
authors provided also an overview of the existing security 
solutions, particularly network security, data security, key 
management, network security protocols, and compliance 
checks. Another study, focusing on public networks, has been 
conducted by Liang et al. in [5]. The paper describes a 
protection framework of smart grid based on a public network. 
This framework was composed of three layers, main station, 
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communication network, and terminals. In [6], Dari et al. 
discussed the security requirements and possible threats on 
smart grid. These threats were classified into three categories: 
people and policy, platform, and network threats. In [7], Wang 
et al. also classified attacks based on the CIA requirements, 
and they described several countermeasures, including 
network security, cryptographic, secure protocols, and secure 
architecture.  
While these survey papers provide various classifications of 
attacks on smart grid, most of them are based upon  
confidentiality, integrity, or availability. However, blended 
and sophisticated attacks such as Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame 
[8] can compromise all of the security parameters at the same 
time. Therefore, such attacks are usually excluded from these 
classification systems. Furthermore, countermeasures and 
security solutions were presented individually for each smart 
grid’s component, and there is no global approach or process 
to combine all security mechanisms in order to ensure security 
for the entire system. 
This paper provides a summary of the current status and 
future expectations of the smart grid cyber security. The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we 
review cyber security objectives in smart grid. Next, we 
present a new classification system of cyber-attack based on a 
method used by hackers or penetration testers. This method 
allows one to better understand the process used by a hacker to 
compromise the smart grid security [9]. Then, we summarize 
and recommend a number of countermeasures. Some 
challenges and future directions are discussed in the last 
section.  
II. SMART GRID OVERVIEW  
A. Smart grid’s features  
The main benefits expected from the smart grid are 
increasing grid resilience and improving environmental 
performance. Resilience indicates the capability of a given 
entity to resist unexpected events and recover quickly 
thereafter [1]. Today, grid resilience as a feature has become 
nonnegotiable, especially when power interruptions can 
potentially impact the economy. Smart grid promises to 
provide flexibility and reliability by enabling additional 
dispersed power supply, facilitating the integration of new 
resources into the grid, and enabling corrective capabilities 
when failures occur. Moreover, smart grid systems are 
expected to enable electric vehicles as replacements for 
conventional vehicles, reducing energy used by customers and 
reducing energy losses within the grid [10]. 
B. Smart grid’s conceptual model  
According to the national institute of standard and 
technology (NIST) [2], a smart grid is composed of seven 
logical domains: bulk generation, transmission, distribution, 
customer, markets, service provider, and operations, each of 
which include both actors and applications. Actors are 
programs, devices, and systems whereas applications are tasks 
performed by a one actor or more in each domain. Fig. 1 
shows the conceptual model of smart grid and the interaction 
of actors from different domains via a secure channel.   
Within the customer domain, the main actor is the end user. 
Generally, there are three types of customers: home, 
commercial/building, and industrial. In addition to consuming 
electricity, these actors may also generate, store, and manage 
the use of energy. This domain is electrically connected to the 
distribution domain and communicates with the distribution, 
operation, service provider, and market domains [2, 11]. 
	
Fig. 1.  Smart grid’s conceptual model based on NIST. 
	
In the market domain, actors are the operators and 
participants in the electricity markets. This domain maintains 
the balance between electrical supply and the demand. In 
order to match the production with demand, the market 
domain communicates with energy supply domains which 
include the bulk generation domain and distributed energy 
resources (DER) [2, 11]. The service provider domain 
includes the organizations that provide services to both 
electrical customers and utilities. These organizations manage 
services such as billing, customer account, and use of energy. 
The service provider interacts with the operation domain for 
situational awareness, system control and also communicates 
with customer and market domain to develop smart services 
such as enabling customer interaction with market and energy 
generation at home [2, 11]. The operations domain’s actors are 
the managers of the movement of electricity. This domain 
maintains efficient and optimal operations in transmission and 
distribution. In transmission, it uses energy management 
systems (EMS), whereas in distribution it uses distribution 
management systems (DMS) [2, 11]. Actors in the bulk 
generation domain include generators of electricity in bulk 
quantities. Energy generation is the first step in the process of 
delivering electricity to the end user. Energy is generated 
using resources like oil, flowing water, coal, nuclear fission, 
and solar radiation. The bulk generation domain is electrically 
connected to the transmission domain and communicates 
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through an interface with the market domain, transmission 
domain, and operations domain [2, 11]. In the transmission 
domain, generated electrical power is carried over long 
distances from generation domain to distribution domain 
through multiple substations. This domain may also store and 
generate electricity. The transmission network is monitored 
and controlled via a SCADA system, which is composed of a 
communication network, control devices, and monitoring 
devices [2, 11]. The distribution domain includes the 
distributors of electricity to and from the end user. The 
electrical distribution systems have different structures such as 
radial, looped, or meshed. In addition to distribution, this 
domain may also support energy generation and storage. This 
domain is connected to the transmission domain, customer 
domain, and the metering points for consumption [2, 11]. 
C. Smart grid’s systems  
Smart grid is composed of several distributed and 
heterogeneous applications, including  advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI) [12], automation substation [13], demand 
response [13], supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA), electrical vehicle (EV) [14], and home energy 
management (HEM) [13].  In this section we will discuss three 
critical and vulnerable applications in the smart grid:  AMI, 
SCADA, and automation substation [1, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17] . 
The other applications were discussed in detail in [12, 13].  
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is responsible for 
collecting, measuring and analyzing energy, water and gas 
usage. It allows two-way communication from the user to the 
utility. It is composed of three components: smart meter, AMI 
headend, and the communication network [18]. Smart meters 
are digital meters, consisting of microprocessors and a local 
memory, and they are responsible first for monitoring and 
collecting power usage of home appliances, and also for 
transmitting data in real time to the AMI headend in the utility 
side. An AMI headend is an AMI server consists of meter data 
management system (MDMS) [12]. The communication 
between the smart meters, the home appliances, and the AMI 
headend is defined through several communication protocols 
such as Z-wave and Zigbee [18].  
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is a 
system that measures, monitors and controls electrical power 
grid. It is typically used for large-scale environments. It 
consists of three elements: the remote terminal unit (RTU), 
master terminal unit (MTU), and human–machine interface 
(HMI) [19]. RTU is a device composed of three components: 
first one used for data acquisition, second one responsible for 
executing instructions coming for the MTU, and a third one 
designed for the communication. MTU is a device responsible 
for controlling the RTU. The HMI is a graphic interface for 
the SCADA system operator [19].  The communication within  
SCADA system is based on many industrial protocol 
including distributed network protocol v3.0 (DNP3) and IEC 
61850 [20].  
The substation is a key element in the power grid network. 
it performs several functions including receiving  power from 
generating facility, regulating distribution, and limiting power 
surge [13]. It contains devices that regulate and distributes 
electrical energy such as a remote terminal unit (RTU), global 
positioning system (GPS), human–machine interface (HMI), 
and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) [21]. The substation 
sends operation data to the SCADA for controlling the power 
system. Many operations are automated within the substation 
in order to increase the reliability of the power grid [1].  The 
communication between the automation substation and other 
devices in transmission and distribution is defined by the 
standard IEC 61850 [22].  
D. Smart grid’s network protocols  
Distributed and heterogeneous applications in smart grid 
require different communication protocols. Fig. 2 illustrates 
the smart grid network architecture and the protocol used 
within each network. In the home area network (HAN), home 
appliances uses ZigBee and Z-wave protocols [18]. In the 
neighborhood area network (NAN), devices are usually 
connected via IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, or IEEE 802.16 
standards [18]. In the wide area network (WAN) and in 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
applications, several industrial protocols are used specially  
distributed networking protocol 3.0 (DNP3) and modicon 
communication bus  (ModBus) [20]. Within substation 
automation, protocol IEC 61850 is used [7].  In this section we 
will discuss two widely used  yet vulnerable protocols in smart 
grid [22-25]:  Modbus and DNP3. Bluetooth, Z-Wave, Zigbee, 
6LoWPAN, WiMAX, IEC 61850 protocol, and power line 
communication are discussed in depth in [12, 14, 22]. 
Modicon communication bus  (ModBus)  is a 7 layer 
protocol of the model OSI; it was designed in  1979 to enable 
the process controller to communicate in real-time with 
computers. There are three types of Modbus: Modbus ASCII, 
Modbus RTU, and Modbus/TCP. In the first one, messages 
are coded in hexadecimal. Though it is slow, it is ideal for 
radio links and telephone communications. In the second one, 
the messages are coded in binary and it is used over RS232. In 
the third one, the masters and slaves uses IP addresses for 
communication [23]. In a SCADA system ModBus is a 
master-slave protocol responsible for exchanging instruction 
between one master, remote terminal unit (RTU) or master 
terminal unit (MTU), and several slave devices, such as 
sensors, drivers, and PLCs  [23]. On one hand, Modbus is 
widely used in industrial architecture, because of its relative 
ease of use by communicating raw data without restriction of 
authentication, encryption, or any excessive overhead [26]. 
One the other hand, these features make it vulnerable and 
easily exploitable [23, 25].  
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Distributed network protocol v3.0 (DNP3) is another widely 
used communication protocol for critical infrastructure, more 
specifically in the electricity industry [24]. It was initiated in 
1990 as a serial protocol to manage communication between 
“Master stations” and slave stations called “outstations’ [26]. 
In electrical stations, DNP3 was used for connecting master 
stations, such as RTUs, with outstations, such as intelligent 
electrical devices (IEDs) [23]. In 1998, DNP3 was extended to 
work over IP network through encapsulation of TCP or UDP 
packets. DNP3 uses several standardized data formats and 
support timed-stamped (time-synchronized) data, making the 
data transmission reliable and efficient [26]. At first DNP3 did  
not provide any security mechanism such as encryption or 
authentication, but this problem was fixed with the secure 
version of  DNP3 called DNP3 secure [7].  
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF SMART GRID 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
has defined three criteria required to maintain security of 
information in the smart grid and keep it protected, 
specifically confidentiality, integrity, and availability [10]. 
According to [27], accountability is another important security 
criterion. The description of each criterion is given below. 
A. Confidentiality  
In general, confidentiality preserves authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure. In other words, the 
confidentiality criterion requires protecting both personal 
privacy and proprietary information from being accessed or 
disclosed by unauthorized entities, individuals, or processes. 
Once an unauthorized disclosure of information occurs, 
confidentiality is lost. For instance, information such as 
control of a meter, metering usage, and billing information 
that is sent between a customer and various entities must be 
confidential and protected; otherwise the customer’s 
information could be manipulated, modified, or used for other 
malicious purposes [10]. 
B. Availability  
Availability is defined as ensuring timely and reliable 
access to and use of information. It is considered the most 
important security criterion in smart grid because the loss of 
availability means disruption of access to information in a 
smart grid [10]. For example, loss of availability can disturb 
the operation of the control system by blocking the 
information’s flow through the network, and therefore denying 
the network’s availability to control the system’s operators. 
C. Integrity  
Integrity in smart grid means protecting against improper 
modification or destruction of the information. A loss of 
integrity is an unauthorized alteration, modification, or 
destruction of data in undetected manner [10]. For example, 
power injection is a malicious attack launched by an adversary 
who intelligently modifies the measurements and relays them 
from the power injection meters and power flow to the state 
estimator. Both nonrepudiation and authenticity of information 
are required to maintain the integrity. Nonrepudiation means 
that individuals, entity or organization, are unable to perform a 
particular action and then deny it later; authenticity is the fact 
that data is originated from a legitimate source. 
D. Accountability 
Accountability means ensuring tractability of the system 
and that every action performed by a person, device, or even a 
public authority is recordable so that no one can deny his/her 
action. This recordable information can be presented as an 
evidence within a court of law in order to determine the 
attacker [28]. An example of an accountability problem would 
be the monthly electricity bills of customers. Generally smart 
meters could determine the cost of electricity in real-time or 
day-to-day. However, if these meters are under attack this 
information is no longer reliable because they have been 
Fig. 2.  Illustration of smart grid network architecture 
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altered. As a result, the customer will have two different 
electric bills, one from the smart meter and the other from the 
utility [27]. 
IV. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND COUNTERMEASURES IN SMART 
GRID  
A. Smart grid attacks 
In general and as shown in Fig. 3, there are four steps used 
by malicious hackers to attack and get control over a system, 
namely reconnaissance, scanning, exploitation, and maintain 
access [9]. During the first step, reconnaissance, the attacker 
gathers and collects information about its target. In the second 
step, scanning, the attacker tries to identify the system’s 
vulnerabilities. These activities aim to identify the opened 
ports and to discover the service running on each port along 
with its weaknesses. During the exploitation step, he/she tries 
to compromise and get a full control of the target. Once the 
attacker has an administrative access on the target, he/she 
proceeds to the final step which is, maintaining the access. 
This step is achieved by installing a stealthy and undetectable 
program; thus he/she can get back easily to the target system 
later.  
 
Fig. 3.  Attacking cycle followed by hackers to get control over a system. 
 
In smart grid, the same steps are followed by attackers to 
compromise the security’s criteria [1].  During each step, they 
use different techniques to compromise a particular system in 
the grid.  Thus, attacks can be classified based on these steps. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the types of attacks during each step. As one 
can see, numerous types of attacks can happen during the 
exploitation step. The malicious activities and attacks during 
each step described below. 
1) Reconnaissance  
The first phase, reconnaissance, includes the attacks: social 
engineering and traffic analysis. Social engineering (SE), 
relies on social skills and human interaction rather than 
technical skills. An attacker uses communication and 
persuasion to win the trust of a legitimate user and get 
credential and confidential information such as passwords or 
PIN number to log on into a particular system. For examples, 
phishing [29] and password pilfering attack [30] are famous 
techniques used in SE. The traffic analysis attack is used to 
listen to the traffic and analyze it in order to determine the 
devices and the hosts connected to the network along with 
their IP addresses. Social engineering and traffic analysis 
compromise mainly the confidentiality of the information.  
2)  Scanning  
Scanning attack is the next step used to discover all the 
devices and the hosts alive on the network. There are four 
types of scans:  IPs, ports, services, and vulnerabilities [9]. 
Generally, an attacker starts with an IPs scan to identify all the 
hosts connected in the network along with their IP addresses. 
Next, he or she goes deeper by scanning the ports in order to 
determine which port is open. This scan is executed on each 
discovered host on the network. The attacker then moves on to 
the service scan in order to find out the service or system 
running behind each opened port. For instance, if the port 102 
is detected open on a particular system, the hacker could infer 
that this system is a substation automation control or 
messaging. If the port 4713 is open, the target system is a 
Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) [1]. The final step, 
vulnerabilities scan, aims to identify the weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities related to each service on the target machine to 
exploit it afterward.  
Modbus and DNP3 are two industrial protocols vulnerable 
to scanning attacks. Given that Modbus/TCP was designed for 
communication rather than security purpose, it can be 
compromised by an attack called Modbus network scanning 
[31]. This attack consists of sending a benign message to all 
devices connected in the network to gather information about 
these devices [31]. Modscan is a SCADA Modbus network 
scanner designed to detect open Modbus/TCP and identify 
device slave IDs along  with their IP addresses [25].  Nicolas 
R. et al. have proposed an algorithm to scan the DNP3 
protocol and discover hosts, specifically, the slaves, their 
DNP3 addresses, and their corresponding master [24]. As one 
can see, these attacks target mainly the confidentiality of the 
smart grid.  
3) Exploitation 
The third step, exploitation, includes malicious activities 
that attempt to exploit the smart grid component’s 
vulnerabilities and get the control over it. These activities 
include viruses, worms, Trojan horses, denial of service 
(DOS) attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, replay 
attacks, jamming channels, popping the human machine 
interface (HMI), integrity violations, and privacy violations. 
 A virus is a program used to infect a specific device or a 
system in smart grid [1, 32]. A worm is self-replicating 
program. It uses the network to spread, to copy itself, and to 
infect other devices and systems [1, 32]. A Trojan horse is a 
program that appears to perform a legitimate task on the target 
system. However, it runs a malicious code in the background. 
An attacker uses this type of malware to upload a virus or 
worm on the target system [1, 32]. In June 2010, Roel 
Schouwenberg, a senior research at Kaspersky Lab, detected 
Stuxnet, the first worm targeting supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems [8]. This is regarded as the first 
cyber attack against a physical industrial control system.  
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Fig. 4.  Cyber attacks classification in smart grid based on the attacking cycle 
 
Stuxnet, a worm of 500 Kilobytes, exploited many zero-
days, which are software vulnerabilities that have not yet 
disclosed by the software owner. It infected at least 14 
industrial sites based in Iran, including a uranium-enrichment 
plant. More than one year later, two more worms that targeted 
industrial control systems were discovered, Duqu and Flame. 
Unlike Stuxnet, Duqu was designed to gather and steal 
information about industrial control systems. Flame, on the 
other hand, was created to be used in cyber espionage in 
industrial networks. It has been found in Iran and other Middle 
East countries [1, 8, 33]. Viruses and worms can compromise 
availability, as Stuxnet did, confidentiality, as Duqu did, or a 
combination of the security’s parameters. 
In denial of service (DOS) attacks, several methods are 
used, particularly SYN attacks, buffer overflow, teardrop 
attacks, and smurf attacks [1, 32], puppet attack [15], time-
delay-switch (TDS) [34], and time synchronization attack 
(TSA) [35]. A SYN attack exploits the three-way handshake 
(SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK) used to establish a TCP session. The 
attacker floods a target system with connection requests 
without responding to the replays, forcing the system to crash. 
The Modbus/TCP protocol is vulnerable to these attacks since 
it operates over TCP [26].   
In buffer overflow, the attacker sends a huge amount of data 
to a specific system, thereby exhausting its resources. For 
example, the ping-of-death is considered as a buffer overflow 
attack as it exploits the internet control message protocol 
(ICMP) by sending more that 65K octets of data. It then 
makes the system crash.  
In a teardrop attack, an attacker alters and modifies the 
length and the fragmentation offset fields in sequential IP 
packets. Once the target system receives these packets, it 
crashes because the instructions on how the fragments are 
offset within these packets are contradictory.  
In smurf attack, the attacker targets not only a specific 
system, but it can saturate and congest the traffic of an entire 
network. It consists of three elements: the source site, the 
bounce site, and the target site. For source site, the adversary 
sends a spoofed packet to the broadcast address of the bounce 
site. These packets contain the IP address of the target system. 
Once the bounce site receives the forged packets, it broadcasts 
them to all hosts connected to the network and then causes 
these hosts to replay, saturating the target system [1, 32].  
In puppet attack [15] targets the advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI) network by exploiting a vulnerability in 
dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol and then exhausting 
the communication network bandwidth. Due to this attack, the 
packet delivery drops between 10% and 20%.  
The time-delay-switch (TDS) [34] attack consists of 
introducing a delay in control system creating instability in the 
smart grid system.  
The time synchronization (TSA) attack [35] targets mainly 
the timing information in smart grid. Because power grid  
operations such as fault detection and event location 
estimation depend highly on precise time information, and 
also most of the measurement devices in smart grid are 
equipped with global positioning system (GPS), attack such as 
TSA, which spoof the GPS information, could have a high 
impact on the system. DOS represents a significant threat to 
the smart grid system because communication and control 
messages in such a system are time critical [11], and a delay of 
few seconds could compromise the system availability.  
The man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is performed when 
an attacker inserts itself between two legitimate devices and 
listens, performs an injection, or intercepts the traffic between 
them. The attacker is connected to both devices and relays the 
traffic between them. These legitimate devices appear to 
communicate directly when in fact they are communicating 
via a third-device [1]. For example, an attacker could conduct 
a MITM, by placing himself on an Ethernet network to alter or 
misrepresent I/O values to the human machine interface 
(HMI) and programmable logic controllers (PLC). The MITM 
could also be used to intercept TCP/IP communication 
between the substation gateway and the transmission SCADA 
server [1]. Peter M. et al. have conducted several experiments, 
including the MITM attack, to compromise the integrity of the 
SCADA communication. They demonstrated the impact of 
such attack on the SCADA servers [17].  Ihab D. et al. [36] 
highlighted the vulnerability of the protocol DNP3 operating 
in SCADA, and they conducted an experiment of MITM 
attack with two scenarios showing  that it is easy to intercept 
the messages exchanged between the master station and the 
outstations, modify the packet’s content, and inject it into the 
network.  
Intercept/alter attack is another type MITM attack. It 
 
 
 
7 
attempts to intercept, alter, and modify data either transmitted 
across the network or stored in a particular device [33]. For 
example, in order to intercept a private communication in 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), an attacker uses 
electromagnetic/radio-frequency interception attack. 
Eavesdropping attack is also another MITM attack’s type, 
where the attacker intercepts private communications between 
two legitimate devices [33]. All these MITM attacks attempt 
to compromise the confidentiality, the integrity, and the 
accountability.  
In replay attack, as the industrial control traffic is 
transmitted in plain text, an attacker could maliciously capture 
packets, inject a specific packet, and replay them to the 
legitimate destinations [1], compromising then the 
communication’s integrity. Intelligent electronic device 
(IED),which is a device designed for controlling and 
communicating with  the SCADA system [7], could be 
targeted by replay attacks so that false measurements are 
injected in a specific register [1]. Replay attack could also be 
used to alter the behavior the programmable logic controllers 
(PLC) [1]. In  AMI, where an authentication scheme is used 
between smart meters, a replay attack involves a malicious 
host to intercept authentication packets sent from smart meter 
and re-sending them at a later point in time, expecting to 
authenticate and gain unauthorised entry into the network [37].  
In the jamming channel attack, an adversary exploits the 
shared nature of the wireless network and sends a random or 
continuous flow of packets in order to keep the channel busy 
and then prevents legitimate devices from communicating and 
exchanging data [38]. Due to its time-critical nature, smart 
grid requires a highly available network to meet the quality of 
service requirements and such an attack can severely degrade 
its performance [38]. Keke G. et al. [16] proposed a jamming 
attack named maximum attacking strategy using spoofing and 
jamming (MAS-SJ) that targets mainly the cognitive radio 
network (CRN) in the wireless smart grid network (WSGN). 
Because WSGN is important for monitoring  power grid in the 
smart grid with the PMU that plays a key component by 
providing time-synchronized data of power system operating 
states [39],  attacks like MAS-SJ can disturb the operation of 
the system or even make it unavailable.   
Popping the HMI is an attack that exploits a known device’s 
vulnerability, especially device’s software or OS 
vulnerabilities, and then installs a remote shell, allowing the 
attacker to connect remotely to the server from his computer 
to get unauthorized access in order to monitor and control the 
compromised system [1]. SCADA systems, substations, or any 
system running an operation system with a console interface is 
considered as a potential target of this attack. Even given the 
potential impact of such an attack, it does not require 
advanced networking skills or significant experience in 
security and industrial control system to perform. Since the 
devices’ vulnerabilities documentation are publicly available, 
a hacker or the so-called script-kiddies may simply use open 
source tools such as Metasploit and meterpreter to launch such 
an attack and gain full control of the target system [1]. The 
availability, integrity, confidentiality, and accountability may 
be compromised based on the attacker’s objective and 
motivation.  
In the masquerade attack, a malicious person may pretend 
to be a legitimate user in order to gain access to a system or 
gain greater privileges to perform unauthorized actions. This 
attack could tamper with the programmable communicating 
thermostat (PCT) which is used to reduce electric power at a 
residential site. It compromises the availability, integrity, 
confidentiality, and accountability of the system [33].  
Integrity violation attacks aim to violate the integrity and/or 
the accountability of the smart grid by altering intentionally or 
unintentionally the data stored in a given device in the 
network. For instance, a customer could perform this attack to 
alter the smart meter data in order to reduce his electricity bill. 
This attack could also be used to target remote terminal unit 
(RTU), so wrong data will be reported to the control center, 
resulting in an increased outage time. False data injection 
(FDI) [40] attack is a type of integrity violation. It aims to 
introduce arbitrary errors and corrupt some device’s 
measurements, affecting the accuracy of the state estimate 
(SE). Since the SE is important for system monitoring to 
ensure reliable operation in the power system, and for the 
energy management system (EMS) to process a real-time data 
collected by the SCADA system, FDI attack could 
compromise the SE’s integrity leading to the instability of the 
smart grid system [40]. A detailed study on the impact of the 
FDI attack on the power system stability was conducted by 
Adnan A. et al. in [41]. 
Privacy violation attack aims to violate privacy by 
collecting private information about customers [28]. For 
example, as smart meters collect electricity usage many times 
per hour, information about the user electricity’s consumption 
could be obtained. Thus, if a meter does not show electricity 
usage for a period of time, that commonly indicates that the 
house is empty. This information could then be used to 
conduct a physical attack like burglary [28]. Depeng L. et al. 
showed that the demand response programs and smart meters 
generate high-resolution data about the customers’ privacy. 
This data could be exploited leading to the loss of customer’s 
information and disclosure of activity patterns [42]. 
4) Maintaining access  
In the final step, maintaining access, the attacker uses a 
special type of attack to gain permanent access to the target, 
especially backdoors, viruses, and Trojan horses.  A backdoor 
is an undetectable program, stealthy installed on the target to 
get back later easily and quickly [32]. If the attacker succeeds 
in embedding a backdoor into the servers of the control center 
of the SCADA, he or she can launch  several attacks against 
the system which can cause a severe impact on the power 
system [43]. 
In IT network, security’s parameters are classified based on 
their importance in the following order: confidentiality, 
integrity, accountability, and availability. Whereas in smart 
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grid, they are classified: availability, integrity, accountability, 
and confidentiality [10, 28]. Thus, we can say that attacks 
which compromise the availability of the smart grid systems 
have a high severity, while those targeting confidentiality have 
a low severity. In addition to the level of severity, each attack 
has a level of likelihood to be performed. For instance, attacks 
such as Stuxnet and Duqu [8], has a high severity because they 
are able to vandalize the industrial control system and bypass 
all the security boundaries; but, they are complex and 
sophisticated. So, these viruses have high severity, but their 
likelihood to be performed is low. Another example is the 
HMI popping attack. It has a high severity and it does not 
require advanced networking skills or significant experience in 
security and industrial control system to perform it. Since the 
devices’ vulnerabilities documentation are publicly available, 
a hacker or the so-called script-kiddies may simply use open 
source tools such as Metasploit and meterpreter to launch such 
an attack [1]. Therefore, this attack has high severity and it is 
very likely to be performed. Table II shows the likelihood of 
each attack to be performed and its associated level of 
severity. 
B. Smart grid countermeasures  
A number of attack detection and countermeasure 
techniques are proposed in the literature to counter cyber 
attacks. For instance, Özçelik I. et al in [44] proposed a 
solution for distributed denial of service (DDos).  In [38], Lu 
Z. et al. proposed a technique to detect jamming channel 
attacks. In [45] Rawat D. et al. proposed a technique to detect 
False detection injection (FDI) attacks. Though these security 
solutions contribute to the smart grid’s security, they are 
insufficient to face sophisticated and blended attacks [1]. 
Moreover, Stuxnet [8] showed that strategy like “Defense in-
depth” or “security by obscurity” [1] are no longer considered 
as valid solutions. We believe that security cannot be achieved 
through one specific solution, but by deploying several 
techniques incorporated into a global strategy. In this section, 
and as Fig. 5 shows, we propose a cyber security strategy 
composed of three phases: pre-attack, under attack, and post-
attack. As follows, and for each phase, relevant published 
solutions in terms of security protocols, security technology,  
cryptography, and other cyber-attack countermeasures are 
described.  
1) Pre-attack  
During this first phase, pre-attack, various published 
solutions are recommended to enhance the smart grid’s 
security and to be prepared for any potential attack. Security 
countermeasures commonly fall into three categories, namely 
network security, cryptography, and device security. We will 
discuss technologies and secure protocols such as IDS, SIEM, 
DLP and secure DNP3 [1, 18, 46] for the network security. 
Encryption, authentication, and key management [4, 7, 32, 47] 
for the data security. Finally, Host IDS, compliance checks, 
and diversity technique for the device security.  
a) Network security 
The network is the backbone of a smart grid. So, network 
security plays a significant role in securing the entire system. 
Using firewalls supplemented with other monitoring and 
inspection technologies is recommended [1] to secure the 
smart grid network. A firewall is intended to allow or deny 
network connections based on specific rules and policies. But 
an unknown or an advanced attack technique can easily bypass 
many firewall techniques. Therefore, firewalls should be 
associated with other security technologies such as intrusion 
detection system (IDS), security information and event 
management systems (SIEM), and network data loss 
prevention (DLP) [1, 18, 46]. IDS is a system developed for 
detecting malicious activity either on a network or on a 
specific host [32]. SIEMS are information management 
systems that collect and gather information such as operating 
system logs, application logs, and network flow from all 
devices in the network. Then the collected information will be 
analyzed and processed by a centralized server in order to 
detect any potential threat or a malicious activity in the 
network. Network DLP is a system responsible for preventing 
the loss or the theft of the data across the network [1]. 
  Severity of the attack 
  Low Medium High 
Likelihood of the 
attack to be 
performed 
High 
• Traffic analysis  
[29, 30, 33] 
• Privacy violation [28] 
 
 
• Virus, worms, Trojan 
horse [8] 
• DOS [15, 35] 
• Backdoor [43] 
Medium 
• Social engineering  
[1, 29] 
• Scanning [25, 28] 
 
• MITM [17, 36] 
• Replay attack   
 [1, 34] 
• Jamming channel  
[16, 38] 
• Masquerade attack 
[33] 
• Integrity violation  
[1, 41, 46] 
Low   
Popping the HMI [1] 
 
TABLE I :  LIKELIHOOD OF THE ATTACK TO BE PERFORMED AND ITS ASSOCIATED SEVERITY. 
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In addition to these security systems, secure network 
protocols such as IPsec, transport layer security (TLS), secure 
sockets layer (SSL), secure DNP3 can also be used to enhance  
security in the network. DNP3 is an industrial protocol widely 
used in smart gird [24]. Initially, DNP3 protocol came without 
any security mechanisms. In other words, messages are 
exchanged in plain text across the network and can be easily 
intercepted.  In recent years, the increased number of cyber-
attacks targeting industrial and power system has attracted the 
attention of a number of researchers in both industry and 
academia. Consequently, a secured variation of DNP3 
protocols has been released named secure DNP3.  
This secured version added a secure layer for encryption 
and authentication between the TCP/IP and application layer. 
Using such a protocol, several attacks can be avoided, for 
example, authentication mechanism can protect against MITM 
attack, whereas encryption decreases eavesdropping and 
replay attacks. Secure DNP3 is discussed further in [7].  
b) Cryptography for data security  
Encryption mechanisms aim to ensure data’s 
confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation. There are two 
types of key encryptions: symmetric and asymmetric. In 
symmetric key encryption, or single-key encryption, one key 
is used to encrypt and to decrypt data. The most used 
algorithms employing symmetric encryption are advanced 
encryption standard (AES) and data encryption standard 
(DES). Asymmetric key encryption, on the other hand, uses 
two keys to encrypt and decrypt data: private key and public 
key. RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) is a widely used 
asymmetric algorithm [32].  In smart grid, various components 
with different computational capabilities co-exist. Therefore, 
both symmetric and asymmetric key encryption can be used, 
and the selection depends on several factors, including data 
criticality, time constraints, and computational resources [4].  
Authentication is defined as the act of verifying that an 
object’s identity is valid, such as the use of a password [32]. 
An object could be a user, a smart device, or any component 
connected to the smart grid network. Multicast authentication 
is a particular type of authentication and its applications are 
widely used in smart grid [47]. In [4], Shapsough et al. 
proposed three methods to achieve authentication for multicast 
applications: secret-info asymmetry, time asymmetry, and 
hybrid asymmetry.  
Key management is a crucial approach for encryption and 
authentication. Public key management (PKI), or shared secret 
key management, can be used to ensure authenticity for 
communication across networks. In PKI infrastructure, the 
identities of two parties is verified by a certificate delivered 
from a third party called the certificate authority (CA). This 
mechanism is done before establishing any connection 
between the two parties. In shared secret key management, 
four steps are used to maintain communication security:  key 
generation, key distribution, key storage, and key update [4]. 
Due to the distributed nature of smart grid, some specific 
requirements should be considered to design a cryptography  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Cyber security strategy for smart grid 
 
key management, W. Wang et al. in [7] present several basic 
yet relevant requirements of the key management scheme, 
particularly efficiency, evolve-ability, scalability, and secure 
management. In addition, several key management 
frameworks have been proposed specifically for the power 
system: single-key, key establishment scheme for SCADA 
systems (SKE), key management architecture for SCADA 
systems (SKMA), advanced key management architecture for 
SCADA systems (ASKMA), ASKMA+, and scalable method 
of cryptographic key management (SMOCK) to name a few. 
The choice of a framework relies on different criteria, 
including scalability, computational resource capability, and 
support for multicast. The authors conducted a comparison 
between the key management schemes listed above. The 
comparison was based on scalability, support for multicast, 
robust to key compromise, and power system application. 
ASKMA+ and SMOCK show interesting results. ASKMA+ is 
an efficient key management scheme and it supports multicast, 
but it still suffers from scalability. SMOCK, on the other hand, 
shows good scalability; however, it has some weaknesses such 
as no support for multicast and low computational efficiency. 
c) Device security  
Device protection is the third crucial element in the supply 
chain of smart grid security. Many research papers and 
recommendation reports have been published contributing to 
security assurance for endpoints. In [1], several security 
technologies have been recommended, particularly, host IDS, 
anti-virus, and host data loss prevention (DLP). Additionally, 
Kammerstetter et al. [48] recommended using an automated 
security compliance check. Such a tool performs a check 
against all smart grid components to verify that each device’s 
configuration is up to date, especially the device’s firmware 
and the current configuration file. As the smart grid 
components are highly connected and a weakness in one 
component can expose the entire system to risk, a compliance 
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check is a crucial tool. In [49], Mclaughlin et al. proposed a 
diversity technique in smart meter’s firmware to limit a large-
scale attack. Using such a technique, an attacker can exploit a 
vulnerability of one device’s firmware, but he or she cannot 
exploit the same vulnerability on other devices.  
2) Under attack  
This step is divided into two tasks: attack detection and 
attack mitigation. Several approaches and technologies can be 
used during each task, to detect the malicious activity, and 
then deploy the appropriate countermeasures. 
During the attack detection, all the deployed security 
technologies are recommended, including SIEMS, DLP, and 
IDS [1, 18, 46]. But, some of these solutions have a number of 
limitations and need improvements, particularly IDS. IDS is a 
widely used security system in IT network, and it is also used 
in smart grid network; but, it has many performance 
limitations specially reporting high rate of false positive. Thus, 
many research papers were published to improve the IDS 
performance in the smart context [46, 50, 51]. Y. Kwon et al. 
[50] proposed an approach based on IDS for the IEC 61850 
protocol. They used both statistical analysis and specification-
based metrics. The experimental results showed that their 
approach could detect anomalies in large networks with low 
false positive. In [51], U. K. Premaratne et al.  proposed an 
IDS IEC61850 automated substations. This rule-based IDS 
was developed based on collecting data from simulated attacks 
on an IED. The result of the experiment showed that the 
IEC61850 IDS was capable of detecting many attacks such as 
a DOS attack, a password cracking attack, and an ARP packet 
sniffer attack. Faisal M. et al. [18] proposed an architecture of 
IDS in AMI based on stream mining algorithms. They 
conducted an experiment to compare the seven existing       
state-of-the-art data stream mining algorithms: Accuracy 
Updated Ensemble, Active Classifier, Leveraging Bagging, 
Limited Attribute Classifier, Bagging using ADWIN, Bagging 
using Adaptive Size Hoeffding Tree, and Single Classifier 
Drift. Their comparison was based on several metrics 
including execution time, detection accuracy, and memory 
consumption. For the assessment they used an original version 
of the KDD Cup 1999 [52] and an improved version of this 
data set. The results showed that some algorithms do not 
require an advanced computational resources, so they are 
suitable for IDS in some devices such as smart meters. Other 
algorithms have a high accuracy and they require more 
computational resources; these algorithms can be used for the 
IDS in a data concentrator or in an AMI headends [18]. Zhang 
Y. et al. [46] proposed a distributed intrusion detection system 
for smart grids (SGDIDS) based on an intelligent model. This 
model can be used in every level of the smart grid: home area 
network (HAN) , neighborhood area network (NAN), and 
wide area network (WAN). The proposed IDS was based on 
data mining algorithms: support vector machine (SVM) and 
artificial immune system (AIS). To evaluate the efficiency of 
their solution, they used a simplified and an improved version 
of the KDD cup 1999 called the NSL-KDD [53]. The 
combination of two classifiers SVM and AIS have produced 
satisfactory results in terms of detection malicious traffic [46].  
Once the attack are detected, mitigation can be executed 
using the following methods. S. Shapsough et al. [4] surveyed 
and summarized several methods used to mitigate the DOS 
attack, especially pushback and reconfiguration methods. In 
pushback, the router is configured to block all the traffic 
coming from the attacker’s IP address. In the reconfiguration 
method, the network topology is changed to isolate the 
attacker. For jamming attacks, Lu et al. [38] discussed anti-
jamming schemes such as frequency hopping spectrum spread 
(FHSS) and direct sequence spectrum spread (DSSS) to 
mitigate attacks. Other mitigation techniques for buffer 
overflow, man-in-the-middle, CPU exhausting, and replay 
attack, distributed denial of service (DDos), and false data 
injection (FDI) were discussed in detail in [3, 27, 44].  
3) Post-attack  
When an attack is not detected, such as in the case of 
Stuxnet [8], the post-attack period is an important step. First, it 
is critical to identify the entity involved in the attack. Then, 
the IDS signature, anti-virus database and security policies 
must be kept up to date by learning from attacks and to protect 
the smart grid against future similar attacks. Forensic analysis 
is the primary technique used during the post-attack. Smart 
grid forensic studies collect, analyze, and intercept digital data 
in order to identify the entity involved in the event. They are 
also useful to determine and address cyber and physical 
vulnerabilities of the smart grid in order to anticipate potential 
attacks. In addition, forensic analysis in smart grid plays an 
important role in the investigation of cyber-crimes such as 
hacking, viruses, digital espionage, cyber terrorism, 
manipulating the operation of the smart grid, violating the 
consumer’s privacy, and stealing valuable information 
including intellectual property and state secrets [54]. 
Table II shows a summary of the cyber attacks in smart grid 
based upon the fours steps: reconnaissance, scanning, 
exploitation, and maintaining access. Each step includes 
attacks’ categories, attacks’ examples, the compromised 
component in the smart grid by each attack, the impact of each 
attack, and the appropriate countermeasures. As we can see, 
the most attacks can be avoided by using secure network 
protocols such as secure DNP3, and also by enabling 
encryption and authentication mechanisms.   
V. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
In heterogeneous systems such as smart grid, different 
devices coexist and communicate through various network 
protocols. This heterogeneity represents a great challenge and 
a potential threat for the smart grid security. The 
communication between devices requires aggregation of data 
and translation between protocols. However, this aggregation 
can enable accidental breaches and vulnerabilities simply 
because a feature in one protocol could not be translated 
properly into another [4].  
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Attacking cycle 
step Attack category 
Attack 
example 
Compromised 
application/protocol 
in smart grid. 
Compromised 
security’s 
parameter 
Possible countermeasures 
Reconnaissance 
Traffic analysis [33] 
Modbus protocol, 
DNP3 protocol Confidentiality 
Secure DNP3, PKI 
(SKMA, SMOCK), TLS, 
SSL, Encryption, 
Authentication[1, 7] 
Social 
engineering 
Phishing [29] 
Password pilfering 
[30] 
Scanning 
Scanning IP, Port, 
Service, 
Vulnerabilities 
Modbus network 
scanning [25] Modbus Protocol 
Confidentiality 
IDS, SIEM, Automated[1] 
security compliance 
checks [48] 
 
DNP3 network 
scanning [24] DNP3 Protocol 
Exploitation 
 
 
Virus, worms, 
Trojan horse 
 
Stuxnet [8] 
SCADA 
PMU, 
Control device 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Accountability 
DLP , IDS , SIEM, Anti-
virus [1], Diversity 
technique[49] 
Duqu [8] SCADA 
 
 
Denial of service 
(DOS) 
Puppet attack [15] AMI 
Availability 
SIEM, IDS [1], flow 
entropy, signal strength, 
sensing time measurement, 
transmission failure count, 
pushback, reconfiguration 
methods [4, 44] 
 
TDS [34] Instability of smart grid systems 
TSA [35] PMU, smart grid equipment’s GPS 
 
Man-in-the-
middle (MITM) 
eavesdropping 
attack [1, 33] HMI, PLC Confidentiality 
Integrity 
 
Secure DNP3, PKI 
(SKMA, SMOCK) [7], 
TLS, SSL, encryption, 
authentication [1] 
[17] SCADA 
[36] DNP3, SCADA 
Intercept/alter [33] AMI 
Replay attack 
[1] IED, SCADA, PLC 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Secure DNP3, TLS, SSL, 
encryption, 
authentication[1] PKI 
(SKMA, SMOCK) [7], 
[33] Authentication scheme in AMI 
Jamming channel 
[38] PMU 
Availability JADE, anti-jamming (FHSS, DSSS) [38] MAS-SJ [16] CRN in WSGN 
Popping the HMI [1] SCADA, EMS, substations. 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Accountability 
DLP, IDS , SIEM , Anti-
virus [1], automated 
security compliance 
checks [48] 
Masquerade 
attack [33] PLC 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Accountability 
 
DLP, IDS, Secure DNP3,  
SIEM, TLS, SSL, 
encryption, authentication 
[1], PKI (SKMA, 
SMOCK)[7] 
Integrity violation 
[1] Smart meter, RTU 
Integrity 
Availability 
DLP, IDS ,SIEM, Secure 
DNP3, TLS, SSL, 
encryption, authentication 
[1],  PKI (SKMA, 
SMOCK) [7, 45] 
FDI [40], [41] EMS, SCADA, AMI 
Privacy violation [28], [42] 
Demand Response 
program, Smart 
meters. 
Confidentiality 
Secure DNP3, PKI 
(SKMA, SMOCK)[7], 
TLS, SSL, encryption, 
authentication [1] 
Maintaining 
access Backdoor [43] SCADA 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Accountability 
IDS, SIEM,Anti-virus  [1], 
Diversity technique[49] 
 
TABLE II : CYBER ATTACKS IN SMART GRID, THEIR IMPACTS AND COUNTERMEASURE 
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Furthermore, the majority of industrial network protocols 
used in smart grid such as, DNP3, ICCP, Modbus, and 
Profibus, were designed for connectivity but not for security 
purposes. Thus, these protocols not only cannot ensure a 
secure communication channel, but they may also be used as 
an attack surface. Though there are some secure version of 
many industrial protocols, such as secure DNP3. However, the 
problem with this new version is its incompatibility  with 
legacy installations [26]. 
In addition to network protocols, operating systems and 
physical equipment in smart grid may be vulnerable and 
expose the system to a wide variety of attacks. Since operating 
systems are designed for control in automation control 
components, they lack security features. Moreover, most of 
the physical devices are obsolete whereas others have 
insufficient memory space and limited computational capacity, 
so they cannot support advanced security mechanisms. For 
instance, smart meters have limited memory and 
computational resources because they are designed for lower 
power consumption, so they cannot support some important 
security mechanisms such as proper random number 
generators and cryptographic accelerators [55]. Although these 
components have less impact on the smart grid operation, if 
they are compromised, they represent a potential vector to 
compromise the whole system.  
Security solutions such as IDS, firewalls, and encryption 
methods play a significant role in securing the conventional 
networks . However, these mechanisms have many limitations 
and they are inappropriate for a distributed environment with 
different application requirements such as latency and 
bandwidth [13]. In addition, these solutions are unable to 
counter the newest types of cyber-attacks. Since cyber-attacks 
are becoming more blended, sophisticated, and complex, they 
are able to target at the same time multiple layers of a 
communication system. For example, as previously 
mentioned, Stuxnet [8] was able to vandalize an industrial 
control system by bypassing all the security boundaries, 
demonstrating that the security solutions deployed in those 
scenarios are unable to detect such an effective virus. 
Furthermore, because there are several logical domains in 
smart grid (generation, transmission, distribution, markets, 
customer, and service provider), security requirements 
necessarily differ from one domain to another. For instance, in 
the generation domain denial of service (DOS) attacks need 
fast detection, which is not the case for market domain, 
customer domain, or service provider domain. In addition, the 
transmission domain requires delay-efficient key management, 
whereas the market domain requires large scale key 
management [7].  
Therefore, rather than applying a simple security approach 
or deploying a specific security technology, we believe that 
smart grid cyber-attacks may be mitigated more effectively by 
combining several security mechanisms through a cyber 
security strategy. Such a strategy have several benefits, 
including, addressing the system’s vulnerabilities, detecting a 
number of cyber-attacks, deploying the appropriate 
countermeasures, and identifying the involved entity. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Smart grid is a system composed of distributed and 
heterogeneous components to intelligently deliver the 
electricity and easily integrate the renewable technologies. 
However, this critical system suffers from a number of 
security weaknesses.  In this paper, we provide a 
comprehensive overview of cyber-security in smart grid and  
investigate in depth the main cyber-attacks threating its 
infrastructure, its network protocols, and its applications. In 
addition, we propose a strategy composed of  several tools and 
mechanisms designed to address potential components’ 
vulnerabilities, detect malicious activities, enhance 
communication security in the network, and protect the 
customer’s privacy.  
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